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Is tax competition good for economic growth? The paper addresses this question by means of 
a simple model of economic growth in which a wasteful Leviathan state sets taxes and 
provides productive input. Wasteful behaviour is restricted by the voter, who reduces political 
support if her income is reduced. The intensity of tax competition is modelled via variation of 
a parameter measuring the mobility of the tax base. It is shown that the effects of increased 
mobility of the tax base on economic growth are ambiguous and that the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, which in this model equals the rate of intratemporal substitution 
between the government's own consumption and its political support, is a decisive variable in 
this context.   
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1. The Issue 
The economist's perception of the role of the state in the economy is somewhat 
ambivalent. On the one hand, even free-market advocates concede that government is 
necessary to provide public goods and in particular the institutional framework without 
which markets would not function. On the other hand, it is claimed that governments 
often do too much and that a large government sector produces significant 
inefficiencies. Pessimists draw the picture of a Leviathan state, which intervenes into 
functioning markets, substitutes inefficient bureaucracies for well-functioning market 
processes, and allows its employees to enjoy safe jobs with high pay and little work.
1 
One may interpret the Leviathan as the public-sector equivalent of the X-inefficient firm 
described by Leibenstein (1966) as an enterprise which does not produce on the edge of 
its production possibility frontier. Why do voters tolerate this waste of resources? 
Downs (1957) argues that it is costly for the voter to be informed about the details of the 
system of government and in particular about the organisation of public administration. 
Voters are rationally ignorant and do not exert sufficient control over the government. 
This gives policy makers and bureaucrats a large degree of discretion which they use to 
follow their own goals, e.g. having safe jobs with high pay and little work. The prodigal 
Leviathan state becomes a virtually inevitable consequence of the system of 
representative democracy. How can this process be reversed or at least mitigated? 
  It has been argued by Brennan/Buchanan (1980), in particular Chapter 9, and 
others that increased competition for mobile factors of production may help to solve the 
Leviathan problem. Owners of factors of production are sensitive to public-sector 
inefficiencies and, ceteris paribus, tend to locate their factors in jurisdictions where 
taxes are low and public-sector services are good. Since immobile voters suffer from 
factor dislocation, they will become dissatisfied with their governments and deprive 
policy makers of their political support. Politicians, who want to be re-elected, are 
forced to provide better conditions for mobile factors of production by offering better 
services at lower taxes. Their discretion is reduced and the Leviathan is tamed. This has 
                                                 
1    Note that the original Hobbesian Leviathan by no means was a system of government 
characterised by the waste of resources. Hobbes characterised a legitimate strong state whose 
omnipotence was justified by the conviction that other systems of government would lead 
into anarchy.   3
been analysed by Edwards/Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000) and the result was 
ambiguous. On the one hand, competition indeed increases the pressure on the state to 
use its tax revenues more efficiently. On the other hand, the increased mobility of the 
tax base induces fiscal externalities and under-provision of public-sector services. The 
latter effects may offset the taming-of-Leviathan effect. 
  This paper is an attempt to extend the analysis to a dynamic framework. The 
question posed here is: does increased competition for mobile factors of production 
force the Leviathan state to change its policies such that higher growth rates are 
achieved? One could argue that lower taxes and better public-sector services do lead to 
faster economic growth. The paper shows that this just one possible outcome. 
Depending on the parameters of the model, more competition may also reduce 
economic growth rate.  
  The paper is in the tradition of the optimum-taxation-and-growth literature 
induced by Judd (1985). Judd derived the result that taxes on capital go to zero in the 
long run – even in situations in which the government is strongly biased towards 
workers' interests. A caveat has been raised by Lansing (1999), who shows that Judd's 
results are based on the implicit premise of the availability of lump-sum or consumption 
taxes collected from the capital owners. There are several other possibilities to achieve 
deviations from Judd's zero-tax result. See Lansing (1999, pp. 427-428). This paper, 
too, comes to the conclusion that capital taxes are not zero and we are able to show that 
there are three components of this effect. One of them is related to the argument put 
forward by Lansing (1999). A second one is based on the possibility that governments 
and private investors have different utility functions. The third one is related to limits on 
lump-sum taxation of workers.  
  The literature on tax competition and growth is small. The great difficulty seems 
to be that optimising governments use private-sector first-order conditions as 
constraints. This implies that second derivatives show up in the optimality conditions. 
In static models of tax competition, e.g. those surveyed by Wilson (1999), this problem 
has been solved. In dynamic growth models matters are often less simple as this paper 
will show. If one is concerned with benevolent governments and purely redistributive 
taxation, models can be designed such that those second derivatives cancel out. One of   4
the simplifications needed to achieve this is that workers do not save. Moreover, 
governments should be benevolent. This is in the tradition of Judd (1985). The approach 
has been applied to tax competition by Lejour/Verbon (1997), who look at a two-
country model. Besides the conventional negative fiscal externality of low taxes, 
resulting from the competition for a mobile tax base, they identify a positive growth 
externality. Low taxes in one country increase the growth rate in the rest of the world. If 
the second effect dominates, uncoordinated taxes will be too high. This contrasts the 
finding of the standard static tax-competition models that taxes tend to be too low. 
Razin/Yuen (1999) look at a more general model that also includes human-capital 
accumulation and endogenous population growth. They come to the conclusion that 
optimum taxes should be residence-based, capital taxes should be abolished along a 
balanced growth path, and taxes will be shifted from the mobile to the immobile factor 
of production if the source principle is applied in a world of tax-competing jurisdictions. 
Their results extend those derived by Judd (1985) and are in accordance with the 
standard economic intuition. The underlying assumption is that the government's set of 
tax instruments is large enough such that distortion-free taxation becomes feasible. We 
will leave this modelling framework by making the following assumptions:  
(a)  The set of instruments is restricted and distorting taxes become desirable. 
(b)  The government is not benevolent, but rather acts as a selfish utility 
maximiser.  
(c)  Taxation is not purely redistributive. The public sector provides productive 
inputs. 
  The paper is organised as follows. The following section 2 will present the 
building blocks of the model. There is a private sector consisting of immobile workers 
and mobile capital owners. The state is a prodigal Leviathan maximising the sum of the 
voter's and its own well-being. Section 3 solves the model and derives comparative-
static results. The parameter which is varied is an index of interjurisdictional capital 
mobility that measures the intensity of interjurisdictional competition. In section 4, we 
introduce a restriction on labour taxes to be able to compare the results of the dynamic 
growth model to those known from the literature on static models of tax competition. 
Finally, section 5 summarises the results and makes some remarks on future research.    5
  
2. Elements of a Model of Tax Competition and Growth 
2.1 Definition of Variables and Characterisation of Technology 
Let us consider a federation consisting of a continuum of infinitely small identical 
jurisdictions, also labelled 'regions', on the unit interval. There is perfect competition in 
all markets and single jurisdictions do not have any market power vis-à-vis the rest of 
the federation. The private sector takes prices and policies announced by regional 
governments as given. Regional governments take variables determined on the federal 
level as given. There are three factors of production: capital, labour, and a publicly 
provided input, denoted  ), ( ), ( t L t K i i  and  ) (t Gi , respectively. The superscript 
represents a particular jurisdiction i and t denotes time. Let the production function be 
defined such that output  () t Qi  is 
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Regarding the factors of production, the following assumptions are made. 
•  Labour. Let the labour supply be inelastic and constant and choose units such that 




t L A i . Thus, 
   () () ( ) ) ( ), ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
t G t K F t G t K t Q i i i i i ≡ =
− α α
 (1') 
•  Capital.  ) (t Ki  denotes a composite capital good consisting of physical capital, 
human capital, and knowledge capital. Initially, each jurisdiction is endowed with 
0 ) 0 ( K K
i = . The capital stock changes over time due to accumulation. Moreover, 
capital can move from one jurisdiction to another. Let  ) ( * t K  denote the total 
capital stock of the federation. Then: 
   ) ( * ) (
1
0
t K di t K
i = ∫ . 
  Since jurisdictions are identical, they will – ex post – employ identical capital 
stocks. Ex ante, however, they may aim at changing the interregional distribution 
of capital by choosing appropriate policies. However at the end of the day, each 
regional government finds out that the policy makers in the other jurisdictions of 
the federation have taken the same actions and that the allocation of capital across   6
regions remains unchanged:  ) ( * ) ( t K t Ki = . Since jurisdictions are identical, the 
superscript i can be dropped such that ex post: 
   ) ( * ) ( t K t K = .  
 ) (t K denotes the capital stock employed in an individual jurisdiction,  ) ( * t K  the 
capital employed in the representative jurisdiction of the federation. Ex post, they 
are equal. Ex ante they may differ. 
•  The public-sector input. The government provides a productive input at a rate 
G(t). This may be interpreted as physical infrastructure such as roads and ports, 
but also institutional infrastructure including the legal framework in which 
economic transactions take place. For the sake of simplicity, we treat this good as 
a flow rather than a stock variable. It may be a public good but it does not have to. 
Interjurisdictional spillovers are excluded. The provision of the public input is 
financed by taxes. There are two types of taxes, a lump-sum tax  ) (t Θ  paid by the 
immobile factor of production and a source tax on capital,  ) (t θ .
2 The 
implementation of taxes and the behaviour of the public sector will be discussed 
in more detail later. 
 
2.2 The Private Sector 
  There are two types of individuals in a jurisdiction, capital owners and workers, 
both types being homogenous and large in number. We assume that capitalists do not 
work and workers do not own capital. Workers consume all their income, whereas 
capitalists do save. This assumption is often used in the literature. See Judd (1985) and 
Lejour and Verbon (1997), for instance. In order to save on notation and to avoid the 
introduction of a capital market into the model, it is assumed that capitalists are 
producers as well. Considering capital owners and producers separately would not 
change the results nevertheless. Finally, producer-capitalists differ from workers in an 
important respect. Unlike workers, they can choose to live where they want. In the case 
                                                 
2  Other papers like Judd (1985, 1999) and Lejour/Verbon (1997) introduce taxes on capital 
income rather than on capital itself. But as long as taxation is linear, the two instruments are 
equivalent.   7
of labour, the factor cannot be separated geographically from its owner. Capitalists, in 
contrast, do not have to live where their capital is employed. In our model, they are 
perfectly mobile. If they are not satisfied with their domicile, they simply dislocate to 
another jurisdiction which offers better conditions. They vote with their feet like in 
Tiebout (1956). The only difference compared to the Tiebout world is that in our model 
mobile capitalists-producers do not demand public goods in the jurisdiction they 
choose. Thus, they are not willing to pay taxes at their place of residence and in a 
competitive world with many jurisdictions, they do not pay taxes at their place of 
residence. Hence, producer-capitalists can only be taxed at source. Perfect mobility has 
yet another implication for the model. Since mobile capital owners can vote with their 
feet, they are not interested in participating in the political process. They do not show up 
at the ballot box and, thus, their interests are not taken into account by the policy maker. 
This has implications for the specification of the policy maker's objective function that 
will become obvious later on.  
 A representative producer-capitalist maximises the present value of her utility. 
Utility is derived from consumption, C(t), only and is of the CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) type with ς being the rate of intertemporal substitution. The discount rate, 
ρ , is positive and constant and the time horizon is infinite. Thus, the individual's 
objective is to maximise  
   ()
dt e












subject to  
   () ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) ( t C t K t t L t w t L t G t K t K − − − = θ Φ & , (2) 
where a dot above a variable denotes its time derivative and w(t) is the wage rate, which 
is exogenous to the decision maker. The control variables are C(t) and L(t). 
   For the remainder of this paper, let us omit arguments of functions for notational 
convenience and let subscripts denote partial derivatives of functions. It is known that 
the problem at hand has the solution 
   w KF F K L = − = Φ , 
   () C F C K ρ θ ς − − = & .   8
Marginal labour productivity equals the wage rate, and the consumption growth path is 
determined by Ramsey's rule of optimum saving, modified slightly to account for 
capital taxation. See Judd (1985), for example. Since F(K,G) is a constant-returns-to-
scale function and G is a variable input, we can look at a balanced growth path along 
which  
   () K F K K ρ θ ς − − = & . (3) 
For the interpretation of some of the results in the following sections of the paper, we 
need the consumption-capital ratio along the balanced growth path for the case of θ =0. 
Taking into account the first-order condition for labour, the state equation, (2), can be 
rewritten: 
   C K KF K K − − = θ & ,  
Setting θ =0 and using (3) to eliminate K & , we obtain 
   () ςρ ς + − = K F
K
C
1      if      0 = θ . (4) 
 
2.3. Capital Mobility 
Equation (3) determines the accumulation of capital in a closed economy. However, we 
are interested in tax competition and its effects on economic growth. Tax competition 
requires openness and, in particular, mobility of a part of the tax base. For the derivation 
of comparative static results, a parameter measuring the degree of mobility should be 
part of the model. The literature offers basically two ways introducing such a measure 
of mobility into the model.  
•  One could assume that parts of the capital stock can be shifted across jurisdictions 
at each point in time and that doing so is costly. Nevertheless, discrete jumps in the 
capital stock of a jurisdiction can occur and in continuous time this corresponds to 
an infinite investment. This is a basic logical flaw of the approach. Moreover, its 
simplest and, therefore, most tractable version does not help. If the cost function is 
symmetric around zero and continuous, e.g. quadratic, the marginal cost at zero is 
nil. Since in a federation with identical jurisdictions the equilibrium investment is 
zero, the marginal cost is zero, too, and the parameter that could measure mobility   9
vanishes. A solution to this problem has been suggested by Lejour and Verbon 
(1997), who use an asymmetric quadratic cost function and allow for bi-directional 
foreign direct investments. The equilibrium is characterised by negative mobility 
costs and a capital allocation such that each capitalist has invested x percent of her 
capital stock outside her own jurisdiction. Doing comparative statics is possible, 
however only at the cost of reduced tractability since three types of capital 
(domestic capital at home, domestic capital abroad, and foreign capital at home) 
have to be distinguished. Still the approach suffers from the logical flaw that cross-
border direct investment is not modelled as a flow, but as a stock variable.  
•  The second approach introduces a second state variable, foreign assets, and 
assumes that foreign direct investment is a flow variable. Capital is not perfectly 
melleable; investment is costly. Following Hayashi (1982) and Blanchard/Fischer 
(1989), ch. 2.4., one can introduce installation costs that impede large capital 
investments. The problem with this approach is the additional mathematical 
complexity resulting from two additional differential equations. The first one 
describes the accumulation of a stock of foreign assets and the second one the 
development of investment flows along the optimal path. Both of them enter the 
policy maker's objective function as constraints. 
Here we choose a third way. The capital accumulation equation, (3), is augmented by a 
mobility term which is economically intuitive and reasonable, but nonetheless lacks an 
explicit derivation from profit-maximising behaviour. A jurisdiction attracts capital 
from the rest of the federation if the rate of return to investment at home,  θ − K F , is 
larger than the rate of return abroad, r*. Ex post,  * r FK = − θ , but ex ante the regional 
government may try to attract additional capital by reducing the tax rate or by 
improving the supply of government inputs. The size of the flow of capital into or out of 
the region depends on an adjustment or mobility parameter and on the sizes of the 
capital stocks at home and in the rest of the federation. We model a gravity relationship 
predicting that foreign direct investment flows are increasing in the capital stocks 
accumulated in the jurisdiction itself and in the rest of the federation. Let this size effect 
be denoted by a function  *) , ( K K φ , increasing in both arguments and exhibiting 
constant returns to scale such that (with units appropriately chosen)  K K K = ) , ( φ . Let γ    10
be the adjustment parameter measuring the flexibility of capital. If this parameter is 
zero, the economy is autarchic and capital does not move. If it goes to infinity, the rate 
of investment goes to infinity or – in other words – the capital stock jumps to its 
equilibrium level such that  * r FK = − θ  instantaneously. The model then converges to 
the class of model known from static tax competition literature where foreign direct 
investment is modelled as a stock variable. Thus, equation (3) changes to   
   () () *) , ( K K F K F K K K φ ρ θ γ ρ θ ς − − + − − = & . (5) 
Of course, foreign direct investments should generate returns to the domestic capital 
owner. However, since capital owners are footloose, their incomes are not part of the 
policy maker's objective function. They are outside of the model and do not have to be 
considered in the remainder of the analysis. 
 
2.4 The Leviathan 
Real-world governments are not benevolent. The assumption of welfare-maximising 
politicians is useful in models designed to answer normative questions: how should the 
government behave and which policy measures should it employ? Here we pose the 
positive question of how governments and public-sector bureaucracies do behave. Like 
all other actors in the economy, policy makers and bureaucrats are selfish utility 
maximisers. They act as agents of a principal: the voter. The control of the agents by the 
principal is, however, imperfect. Voters are rationally uninformed about the details of 
the conduct of public policy. See Downs (1957). Therefore, policy makers and public-
sector bureaucrats enjoy discretion, which they use to follow their own objectives. This 
may result in biased policies, salaries exceeding marginal productivity, leisure on the 
job, unproductive status-seeking in public-sector bureaucracies and other activities that 
informed voters would perceive as a waste of tax money. The complex and multifaceted 
set of wasteful activities is operationalised in our analysis by simply assuming that the 
public sector consumes a part of its budget R(t).  
   G K R − + = θ Θ ,    (6) 
where Θ  is the tax revenue from lump-sum taxes, θ K that from source taxes on capital, 
and G the productive government expenditure. This way of modelling the Leviathan   11
was introduced by Brennan/Buchanan (1989), Ch. 2, and used in tax competition 
models by Edwards/Keen (1996) and Rauscher (2000).
 3 Note that R is not a budget 
surplus. To the public-sector employee it is a rent; to the voter it is a waste of resources. 
The budget is balanced in every period. It may be argued that in an intertemporal model, 
the government should have an intertemporal budget constraint. This case will be 
discussed towards the end of the paper. Nonetheless, in reality governments are usually 
constitutionally restricted in their borrowing. The European Stability and Growth Pact 
of 1997 is just one example and on the sub-national level the constraints on public 
borrowing are even tighter. Equation (6) is a simplified way of modelling such 
constraints 
  Voters may be ignorant concerning the details of the government budget, but they 
can distinguish a good government from a bad government. They simply look into their 
purses. A good government implements policies that help people to achieve high 
incomes and living standards. A bad government fails to do so. Thus, everything else 
being equal, the higher the income, the better is the government in the perception of the 
voter and the larger is the degree of political support it can enjoy. In our model, capital 
owners vote with their feet and, therefore, are irrelevant for political support. What 
matters are the incomes of the owners of the immobile factor of production. Thus we 
take labour income,   
   K KF F Y − = , (7) 
as a measure of political support.  
 Let  u(.,.) be the government's utility function, with the rent, R, and labour income, 
Y, as its arguments. Assume uR>0,  uY>0,  uRR<0,  uYY<0 and, for the sake of 
simplification, uRY=0. To keep the model tractable, the utility function is calibrated as a 
CES function: 





















Y R u   
                                                 
3   Qian and Roland (1998) look into the black box of the Leviathan state and model the waste 
of public resources as an incentive and supervision problem in public hierarchies.   12
σ is the elasticity of substitution between rent appropriation and political support. At the 
same time, it is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which has a decisive impact 
on the growth rate the government wants to achieve. The government maximises the 
present value of future utility discounted at a positive rate δ. Note that neither the 
discount rate nor the intertemporal elasticity of substitution must equal those of the 
private sector. E.g., self-interested policy makers may be much more short-sighted than 
private investors. This would imply  ρ δ > . Moreover, there is no reason to expect that 
the intertemporal elasticities of substitution are equal in the private and the public 
sectors. Thus, in general  ς σ ≠ . The policy maker's objective is to maximise 






with respect to the tax rates, Θ , θ, and provision of the public-sector input G, subject to 
the state equation, (5), and the initial condition that K(0)=K0. 
 
3. Solving the Model 
It should be noted that all jurisdictions face the same optimisation problem and solve it 
in the same way. Thus, the results derived for an individual jurisdiction generalise to the 
federation as a whole. The current-value Hamiltonian of the individual government's 
optimisation problem is 
  ()
() ( ) ( ) [] * , *
,
K K r F K F
KF F G K u H
K K
K
φ θ γ ρ θ ς λ
Θ θ Θ
− − + − − +
− − − + =
 (8) 
with λ being the costate variable of capital. The canonical equation is 
   () ( ) () Y KK R KK K u KF u K F F + − + − − − − = θ λ γ ς ρ θ ς δ λ & , (9) 
Note that we have inserted the conditions of the ex-post equilibrium,  0 *= − − r FK θ  and 
() K K K = * , φ , already. The first-order conditions are 
   Y R u u = , (10a) 
   () λ γ ς + = R u , (10b) 
   () ( ) λ γ ς KG Y KG G R F u KF F u + + − = , (10c)   13
In (10c), the condition that  () K K K = * , φ   ex post, has been used again. Equation (10a) 
can be rewritten: 






The marginal rate of substitution between the rent and political support equals one. This 
is intuitive since one unit of rent costs one unit of political support if it is financed by 
lump-sum taxes. Using (10a) and (10b) in equation (10c) yields 
   1 = G F . (11) 
The marginal productivity of the public-sector input equals 1. This is straightforward 
since each unit of this good costs one unit of consumable income. Thus, equation (11) is 
nothing else but the condition that the marginal value product of a factor equals its 
price. Thus we have 
 
Proposition 1 
In the first best, the provision of the public input is efficient in the sense that its 
marginal productivity equals its marginal supply cost.  
 
As a corollary from  1 = G F , we have under constant returns to scale that FK is 
constant.
4 
Since the production function exhibits constant returns to scale in the variable 
factors, the outcome of a model is a balanced growth model in which variables grow at 
the same rate, g. Let a hat above a variable represent its growth rate. Thus, we have  
   () ρ θ ς Θ − − = = = = K F G K g ˆ ˆ ˆ . (12)   
In the steady state and the tax rate, θ , is constant. 
  It follows from (10b) that that in the steady state  R u ˆ ˆ = λ . Then combining (9) and 
(12) we have 
                                                 
4   Under constant returns to scale, the factor-price frontier is fixed. Since it is monotonous (it is 
decreasing of course), FK  is determined uniquely if FG  is determined.   14
   () () ( )
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KF F F + − + − − − − = − − −  (13) 
Using the first-order conditions to eliminate  λ / R u  and  λ / R u  and rearranging terms, 
we arrive at 
   () ( )
σγ ς




= K F 1
 (13') 
In the case of a closed economy (γ =0), this tax rate is modified such that 
   () ( )δ
ς
σ
ρ σ θ + − − = K F 1 0  (13'') 
Unlike in many other models of capital taxation and growth, the resulting capital tax 
rate is not zero. There are two sources of this deviating result. On the one hand, the 
government cannot tax capital owners lump-sum. Thus, source-based taxes have to be 
used although they distort the accumulation of capital. See Lansing (1999), who has 
shown this in a somewhat different modelling framework. On the other hand, the 
preferences of a Leviathan government may deviate systematically from those of the 
private sector. Thus, policy makers are tempted to use distorting taxes to manipulate the 
growth rate. E.g., if it has a higher discount rate than private investors, it is less 
interested in future accumulation of capital and in economic growth than the private 
sector. Capital accumulation can be reduced by raising the tax rate. For a myopic 
government such a policy is beneficial since this raises tax revenue, political support, 
and public-sector consumption in the initial periods. This explains why the optimum tax 
rate is unambiguously increasing in δ . See equation (13'). Moreover, it can be seen from 
this equation that the adjustment-speed parameter γ  has a dampening effect on the tax 
rate:  () ( ) θ γ θ − = sg d d sg / . This is also intuitive since larger capital mobility reinforces 
capital movements that could – ex ante – lead to inefficient allocations of capital across 
jurisdictions if distorting taxes are used. If the adjustment parameter goes to infinity, i.e. 
if capital becomes perfectly mobile, the tax rate goes to zero. This is explained by the 
fact that the growth rate is determined exogenously as  () ρ ς − * r  in the case of perfect 
capital mobility. The government of an individual jurisdiction is incapable of 
influencing this rate. Moreover, taxation of mobile capital for the purpose of generating 
tax revenue becomes infeasible if capital can flee taxation at zero cost. 
    15
Proposition 2 
The optimum tax rate is increasing in the Leviathan's discount rate. Capital 
mobility has a dampening effect on the tax rate. If capital is perfectly mobile, the 
source tax on capital is zero. The impacts of the other parameters are ambiguous. 
  
  To separate the two components of the optimum tax rate, consider a situation in 
which government and private sector have the same discount rate and the same 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution:  ς σ =  and  ρ δ = . Denote the corresponding 
optimal tax rate by θ
~
 in the general case and  0
~
θ  in the autarky case (γ =0): 








1 ~ K F
. (14) 
   () ςρ ς θ + − = K F 1
~
0 . (14') 
It is obvious from (14) that this tax component is always positive. A government 
interested in workers' well-being will always tax capital. Interestingly,  0
~
θ  equals the 
private sector's optimal consumption-to-capital ratio in the absence of taxes. See 
equation (4). Thus, in a closed economy with γ =0, the tax revenue collected from the 
capital owners equals the consumption level that they would have chosen in the absence 
of taxes. This result differs from that reported by Lansing (1999, p.437), who derives a 
tax rate of ½ for a scenario with logarithmic utility functions in which a benevolent 
government maximises the welfare of workers. Our result for the Leviathan government 
with a logarithmic objective function would be  ) 1 /(
~
γ ρ θ + = . As expected, equation 
(14) shows that the mobility parameter has a negative effect on θ
~
. If capital mobility 
increases, the desirability of capital taxes is reduced since they become increasingly 
distortive. 
  The other component of the optimum tax rate is due to the government's attempt 
to influence the economy's growth rate according to its own time preference rate and 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The optimum growth rate from the point of view 
of the government would be  () δ σ − K F  in a closed economy. From equation (12), one 
can determine the tax rate necessary to adjust the private sector's rate of accumulation to 
this desired value. Let this tax rate be denoted by 
G
0 θ .   16












G F 1 0 . (15) 
Here, we only give the result for  0 = γ . A derivation of this tax component for the case 
of imperfectly mobile capital would require the explicit consideration of 
interjurisdictional flows of factor rewards and therefore a substantial extension of the 
model. In the case of perfect mobility, the economy's growth rate is exogenously 
determined by  () ρ ς − * r  and cannot be influenced by any taxes. 
  The two tax components do not in general add up to the optimal tax:  
   () ( ) K K






− + − − + = +
ς
σ
ρ ς σ θ θ θ 1
~
0 0 0 .  
Only if the elasticities of substitution are equal,  ς σ = , all terms on the right-hand side 
except the first one vanish and we have  0 0 0
~
θ θ θ = +
G . This indicates the existence of a 
non-trivial interaction effect depending on the ratio of the private and public-sector 
elasticities of intertemporal substitution. 
  The growth rate of the economy, g, is determined by equation (12), into which 
(13') can be inserted: 





= K F g  (16) 
Differentiation with respect to γ   yields 
  
()










2  (17) 
This implies the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3 
The effect of increased capital mobility on the growth rate of the economy is 
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 − K F 1
1
. 
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Two special cases will be considered: 
•  If  1 = σ , i.e. if the policy maker's objective function is logarithmic, then the growth 
rate will unambiguously be affected positively by increased capital mobility. 
•  Assume 0 > − ρ K F , i.e. the economy would grow in the absence of capital 
taxation. Then, the impact of capital mobility on economic growth is positive if σ  is 
small and negative if σ  is substantially larger than 1. 
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution has yet another interpretation. It does not 
only measure indicate whether actual and future utility are good substitutes; it also 
measures the substitutability between rent and political support. If they are good 
substitutes, then the increase in capital mobility can result in lower economic growth. In 
order to provide the economic intuition behind this result, one would have to 
disentangle the elasticities of intertemporal and intratemporal substitution by using a 
different modelling framework. 
 
4. A Restraint on Lump-sum Taxes: The Taming of Leviathan?   
  Lump-sum taxes are a delicate issue. For reasons of political feasibility, the 
government may refrain from implementing lump-sum taxes on a large scale. This is the 
conventional starting point of the literature on tax competition in a static world. See 
Wilson (1986) and Zodrow/Mieszkowksi (1986) for original contributions and Wilson 
(1999) for a survey. We will introduce a limit on lump-sum taxation, too. But before 
doing that, a caveat is necessary. In our model, the governments objective function has 
two arguments, the rent and, as a proxy for political support, the income of the 
immobile factor. Usually, the introduction of a restraint on lump-sum taxation is 
justified by distributional concerns. Here these concerns are, however, taken into 
account in the objective function already. Increased concern for worker's income should 
result in a change in the utility function such that a larger weight is attached to labour 
income. This would lead to an increase in workers' income at the expense of public-
sector rent and everything else would remain unchanged. All the results of the previous 
section are maintained.    18
  Non eth el ess, we will  l ook at a con strai n t on  l um p-sum  taxes. Of  course, i t is 
interesting to do this for reasons of comparison with known static models of tax 
competition. But it is also possible to justify this restriction on the basis of economic 
arguments. If, e.g., people dislike taxes per se, then such a restriction would make sense. 
Moreover, if the taxes on workers' incomes cause deadweight losses that are not taken 
into account by the model explicitly, then the marginal cost of public funds is 
increased.
5 As will be seen shortly, this has the same effect as the restriction on the use 
lump-sum taxes. We model this by imposing an upper bound, Θ  to such taxes: 
   . 0 ≥ − Θ Θ   
The Hamiltonian is augmented by a Lagrangian term  () Θ Θ ξ − : 
 
()
() ( ) ( ) [] () Θ Θ ξ φ θ γ ρ θ ς λ
Θ θ Θ
− + − − + − − +
− − − + =
* , *
,
K K r F K F
KF F G K u H
K K
K  (8') 
Complementary slackness implies   
   () 0 = − Θ Θ ξ ,    0 ≥ ξ  
and if the constraint is binding,  0 > ξ . Thus, first-order condition with respect to the 
lump-sum tax, Θ   is changed 
   ξ + = Y R u u . 
It follows that  






The opportunity cost of appropriating the rent is increased. The same result would be 
obtained if Θ  represented a distorting labour income tax: the damage to the private 
sector of the economy would be larger than the government's revenue and the 
opportunity cost of public-sector consumption would be raised to a value larger than 
one.  
  The other first-order conditions, (10b) and (10c), and the canonical equation, (11), 















                                                 
5   An example is the distortion generated by income taxes in the case of inelastic labour supply.    19
and it follows that  
   1 > G F . (20) 
This indicates an inefficient under-provision of public-sector inputs as known from 
static models of tax competition like Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986) and Rauscher 
(2000).
6 Due to the increase in the marginal cost of public funds, the marginal cost of 
providing the input is increased. This implies an inefficiently high ratio of private 
capital to public inputs. The marginal productivity of capital is smaller than without the 
restriction on Θ  and this has a negative impact on the economic growth rate. 
 
Proposition 4 
A restriction on lump-sum taxation leads to inefficiently low supply of 
government goods and to an increase in the opportunity cost of the public-sector 
rent.  
 
  In the steady state, two variables need to be determined, the tax rate, θ , and the 
factor input ratio, G/K. The second equation, besides (19), to determine these variables 
is again (13), which is based on the balanced-growth condition,  R u ˆ ˆ = λ .
7 Using (10b) 
and rearranging terms yields 



























σδ ρ σ ς
θ  (21) 
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation is known from the previous 
considerations. The second term is due to the limit on lump-sum taxation. It is positive 
as expected. The restriction on the use of one type of taxation leads to an increased use 
of alternative tax instruments. Partial differentiation of (21) with respect to γ   yields 
 
                                                 
6   Note that the Zodrow/Mieszkowski (1986) result is valid only for a special class of 
production functions and not generally, as they claim. See Sinn (1997).  
7    Note that this requires the additional assumption that Θ =0. Otherwise it would not be 
possible that all relevant variables grow at the same rate.   20
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For a constant factor input ratio, the impact of additional capital mobility on the tax rate 
is ambiguous. The first term again shows a dampening effect. If this tax component is 
positive, its derivative is negative and vice versa. The decisive parameter here is the 
government's elasticity of intertemporal substitution. If σ  is substantially larger than 
one, then this component of the tax is increased by additional mobility. Otherwise, it is 
reduced. As regards the other component of the tax rate, the opposite conclusion is 
drawn. If  1 > σ , the second term is reduced. If  1 < σ , this term is increased. This 
finding corresponds to the result derived by Rauscher (2000) in a static modelling 
framework. There it was shown that a large elasticity of substitution leads to positive 
effects of tax competition and a small elasticity leads to negative effects. The intuition 
behind this result is that tighter competition for the mobile tax base in the absence of 
lump-sum taxes increases the opportunity cost of rent-seeking. If the elasticity of 
substitution is large, this leads to a significant reduction of wasteful behaviour and this 
is good for the economy. The same idea can be applied to our model. Here, the positive 
effect is a reduction in the tax rate, leading to more growth. The negative effect is an 
increase in the tax rate, leading to smaller (or even negative) growth.  
  Note the all these considerations are based on partial derivatives, i.e. under the 
assumption that the other variables are constant. However, they are not constant, but are 
themselves affected by a change in the tax rate. Equations (19) and (21) should be 
considered together and total differentials should be calculated. This is done in the 
appendix for the Cobb-Douglas case and it is seen that the use of partial derivatives may 
be misleading. Nonetheless, the results derived in this section of the paper can be 
summarised as follows. 
   21
Proposition 5 
Under restricted use of lump-sum taxes, the source tax on capital consists of 
three components  
(a) an effect coming from the government's attempt to influence the growth rate, 
(b) an effect due to the absence of lump-sum taxation of capital owners, and  
(c) an effect due to the absence of lump-sum taxation of workers.  
The total effect is ambiguous and the sign of the impact of capital mobility on the 
tax rate and on economic growth is ambiguous, too. The government's elasticity-
of-substitution parameter is decisive for the direction of this effect. 
 
5. Final Remarks 
This paper has looked at the effects of increased interjurisdictional capital mobility on 
taxation and economic growth. The government was modelled as a prodigal Leviathan. 
It turned out that the optimal tax on mobile capital is determined by the non-availability 
of distortion-free taxes and by the deviation of the government's preferences from the 
private ones. The decisive variable in the determination of the effects on tax rates and 
economic growth is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The general results are 
ambiguous. Anything can happen. An increase in the intensity of interjurisdictional 
competition may be growth enhancing or growth decelerating. Some basic intuitions for 
the results gave been given in the paper. 
  Of course, the modelling framework is rather simple and neglects many 
phenomena that are relevant in the real world, e.g. savings by workers, imperfect 
mobility of capital owners, and public-sector borrowing. In particular, the constraint of 
an intratemporally balanced government budget is restrictive. Although such 
assumption can be justified on the grounds that government borrowing is restricted 
(albeit in a laxer sense than in this model), it might be interesting allow for more 
flexibility. Modifying the model in this respect would add another determinant of 
taxation in a closed or imperfectly open economy: governments could use distorting 
taxes to reduce the interest rate and, thus, relax their intertemporal budget constraints.   22
  Another extension would be to model the government input as a capital good, i.e. 
a stock rather than a flow variable. One could also add technological progress in the 
government sector to ask whether tax competition increases the rate of innovation: does 
tax competition contribute positively to a modernisation of the public sector? This 
question is on the agenda for future research.  
 
Appendix: Comparative Statics for the Cobb-Douglas case 






























































σδ ρ σ ς
θ . (21) 
The first equation is the marginal rate of substitution derived from the Leviathan's utility 




k =  
From the Cobb-Douglas function, (1'), we have: 
   K k F
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Using this in the three equations and rearranging terms yields: 
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Thus, the adjoints, displayed as numerators on the right-hand sides of these equations 
have unambiguous signs. The sign of the determinant in the denominator can be 
positive or negative. It depends on b33. If  0 33 < b , then  0 ) det( < B . Otherwise det(B) 
can be positive. Given that fact that the other terms determining det(B) are negative, this 
is unlikely, but it cannot be excluded.  
  It can be seen from (A5) and (A7), however, that  γ θ d d / a n d   γ d dk /  have 
opposite signs. A large tax rate is bad for economic growth. A large ratio of capital per 
unit of government input implies a low capital productivity and, therefore, is also bad 
for economic growth. Due to the opposite directions of the two effects, an additional 
ambiguity in the determination of the impact on economic growth becomes obvious.    24
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